A01 Public offering(2016-2017) MAKINO

A01 Public offering:  Micro Empirics I

 

Research Topic:  Empirical Studies on Politician-Teacher Patron-Client Relationship

Research Number:  16H00741

Name:Momoe MAKINO,

Affiliation・Title:  Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO)・Research Fellow

 

Educational reform toward enhancing literacy and school quality is often considered “politically unacceptable” in developing countries. However, it is not clear what “politically unacceptable” means concretely. The purpose of this research is to investigate the factors behind little progress of educational reform in developing countries that is indispensable for them to move into emerging and developed countries, and lead to policy implications for educational reform.

The focus of research is Pakistan, which has many illiterate populations and aspires to achieving a high rate of economic growth like India. The unique teacher-household surveys were conducted in Pakistan to empirically examine the hypothesis that politicians and teachers are in the patron-client relationship, which affects voting behavior of ordinary villagers.

In the year 2016, the teacher-household surveys were conducted. Teacher questionnaire tries to capture the level of political influence concerning teachers’ recruitment, transfer and redeployment both for public and private schools. Household questionnaire tries to capture the level of teachers’ influence over villagers’ voting behavior.

In the year 2017, the follow-up survey was conducted. Based on these surveys, I pursued empirical analysis, wrote up a research paper, and presented it in workshops and conferences.

The follow-up survey revealed the following points.

(1)    Nepotism in teacher recruitment. The teacher recruitment was computerized in 2012. There was a room for nepotism prior to 2012, and our sample may include some teachers recruited via nepotism. Prior to computerization, politicians of provincial and federal governments could have quotas on candidates for new teachers and submit a list of their preferred candidates to the district office that was in charge of teacher recruitment. These listed candidates had priority to be recruited as a teacher. And thus, the association between general elections (for provincial and federal governments) and teacher recruitment seems strong.

(2)    Are there any merits for teachers to have political connection once becoming a teacher? Any merit concerning transfer is not obvious because teachers who are assigned to their preferred school are hardly transferred to other schools for their entire teaching life. (They can request a transfer to their preferred school once they work as a teacher for three years.) However, it is possible that they are promised never being transferred in exchange for their political support to a certain candidate. In this case, the situation of no transfer can be interpreted as a sort of equilibrium and a merit. Another explicit merit is that negative reports are unlikely to be sent to district and tehsil offices. The Community Development Board in the village is supposed to report any misconduct of teachers. However, the Board members consist of village influential persons including the ones from teacher households, and thus, negative reports rarely come out.

The empirical analysis found that villagers’ voting decision-making strongly depends on their informal network and that the teacher households have some influence over their voting decision-making. Informal network plays a role in providing informal credit and unpaid labor.

 

【Articles】

<2018>

[1] Makino, Momoe. “Female Labor Force Participation and Dowries in Pakistan,” mimeo, IDE-JETRO.

<2017>

[1] Makino, Momoe. “Dowry in the Absence of the Legal Protection of Women’s Inheritance Rights,” Review of Economics of the Household, 2017, DOI: 10.1007/s11150-017-9377-x

[2] Makino, Momoe. “Birth Order and Sibling Sex Composition Effects among Surviving Children in India: Enrollment Status and Test Scores,” Developing Economies, forthcoming.

<2016>

[1] Makino, Momoe. “Birth Order and Sibling Sex Composition Effects among Surviving Children in India,” invited to revise and resubmit to Developing Economies, October 2016

 

【Conference presentations】

<2017>

[1] Makino, Momoe. “Female Labor Force Participation and Dowries in Pakistan,” Asian and Australasian Society of Labour Economics, Canberra, December 2017.

[2] Makino, Momoe. “Government vs. Private Schools nexus Voting Decision Making,” Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, Tokyo, September 2017.

[3] Makino, Momoe. “Dowry and Female Labor Force Participation in Pakistan,” Society of Economics of the Household, San Diego, June 2017.

[4] Makino, Momoe. “Dowry and Female Labor Force Participation in Pakistan,” Population Association of America, Washington, DC, April 2017.

<2016>

[1] Makino, Momoe. “Dowry and Female Labor Force Participation in Pakistan,” Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, Kobe, September 2016.

[2] Makino, Momoe. “Better than Nothing? Dowry in the Absence of the Legal Protection of Women’s Inheritance Rights,” Population Association of America, Washington, DC, March 2016.

 

【Contribution to society】

<2017>

[2] Makino, Momoe. “Research Frontier of Developing Countries: Can Son Preference Explain Short Height of Indian Children?,” IDE Square: Column, November 2017.

<2016>

[1] Makino, Momoe. IDE Seminar Speaker “Gender Issues in South Asia and Marriage Practice: Missing Women, Dowry, Exchange Marriage, and Child Marriage,” IDE-JETRO, December 2016 (in Japanese).

[2] Makino, Momoe. “Research Frontier of Developing Countries: Any Difference in Learning Effects between Government and Private Schools?”, Ajiken World Trend, August 2016, pp.60–61 (in Japanese).

EOM