

## **Japan's Foreign Policy**

### **Lecture Four: Nov. 4 (Fri) 2011**

\*Related chapter in Iokibe's edited volume, *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan*: Chapter 2 and 3 "The model of economic power: Japanese diplomacy in the 1960s."

\*If you have any question on the lecture, email to TA ([masayasu.tsuzuki@gmail.com](mailto:masayasu.tsuzuki@gmail.com)).

### **Outline**

#### **Chapter 3 "After Independence: South East Asia, Soviet Russia, and the Revision of the Security Treaty" (continued)**

##### **Kishi and the Revision of the Security Treaty**

Kishi Diplomacy in 1957 (last class)

Opposition from the LDP

Kishi's resignation

#### **Chapter 4 "Diplomacy during the Era of Rapid Economic Growth"**

##### **1. Hayato Ikeda and the Economic Diplomacy**

The challenges of the Ikeda Cabinet

IMF/Bretton Woods System: the pillar of international order

GATT: strong opposition to Japan, the memory of pre-war dumping

Invocation of Article 35

Transfer to Article 8 status in 1963

Becomes a member of the OECD in 1964

Policies toward South-East Asia

Significance of the Tokyo Olympic games in 1964

"Japanese-American Equal Partnership", "the three pillars of the free world"

The Cuban Crisis in 1962

##### **2. Normalization of the diplomatic relation with South Korea**

Korea unable to participate in the San Francisco Peace Conference

The preliminary talks started in Oct. 20<sup>th</sup>, 1951.

The first round of talks: Feb. 5<sup>th</sup>, 1952 - Apr. 25<sup>th</sup>

118 the Rhee Syngman (李承晩) Line of 60 sea miles

328 Japanese fishing boats captured, 3929 people interned and 44 people died in total.

The second and third round of talks and the Kubota Remarks, 1953

The fourth round of talks: Apr. - Dec., 1958, and Aug – Nov., 1959

(Syngman Lee administration weakened and collapsed in Apr., 1960)

The sixth round of talks: Oct. 1961 – Apr. 1964

Park Chung-Hee (朴正熙) stopped in Japan in Nov. 1961.

Ohira (Masayoshi) - Kim (Jong-pil) (金鐘泌) notes in Nov. 1962.

The seventh round of talks: Dec. 1964 – Feb. 1965

The Issues:

1. Validity of the 1910 Annexation Treaty
2. The rights of claim: South Korea demanded reparations. Japan  
Ohira – Kim notes: \$300 million as grant + \$200 million as a loan + \$300 million as economic assistance by private banks.  
All rights of claim were fulfilled.
3. Legitimacy of the South Korea government
4. Takeshima island

## **Chapter 5. “the Okinawa reversion”**

Importance of the military bases for the U.S.

Kishi-Eisenhower Talks in 1957

Ikeda- Kennedy talks in 1961

Caraway (High Commissioner of Ryukyu Islands) arrives in Aug. 1964

Beginning of Japan-U.S. negotiations

Several Ideas

Vietnam War

1965–1967, Searching for the way

Nov. 1967, Sato-Johnson talks

Decision to “nuclear free, mainland status” in March 1969

Nov. 1969, Sato-Nixon talks

## **The Characteristics of the reversion negotiations**

Citizen movements for the return of Okinawa

Consensus and competition within the Liberal Democratic Party

The role of public intellectuals

Leadership of Prime Minister Sato

Unresolved issues

Flexible operation of the Security Treaty Prior Consultation

Cooperating for the Vietnam War

Secret agreements

### **The Textile Problem**

Nixon requests Sato to adopt self-imposed regulation of textile goods

The business community ready to accept it for the sake of Okinawa reversion

Minister of International Trade and Industry Ohira (No.2 in the Maeo faction)

Reluctant to help Sato's success

Change of Ohira to Miyazawa in cabinet reshuffle in Jan. 1970

Miyazawa visits US in June 1970

An Asahi editorial welcomes the break out (June 26<sup>th</sup> 1970)

A proposal for solution in March 1971

Tanaka Kakuei becomes Minister of MITI, July 1971

A ridiculous policy in multiple ways

Complication and solution through power politics

Sato's ambiguous style, ineffective this time

From High politics to Low politics

### **Chronology**

#### **1951(Showa 26)**

1020 The preliminary talks start for normalizing the diplomatic relation with South Korea.

#### **1952 (Showa 27)**

0118 The Rhee Syngman (李承晩) Line of 60 sea miles.

0205 The first round of talks for normalizing the diplomatic relation with South Korea(- 0425)

#### **1958 (Showa 33)**

0522 28<sup>th</sup> General Election

1108 Ikeda, Miki, Nadao resign over the Policemen's Duty Performance Law

**1959 (Showa 34)**

0618 Cabinet reshuffle, Ikeda Hayato joins the Cabinet

**1960 (Showa 35)**

0119 New Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed

0519 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is approved in Lower House of Parliament

0623 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is enacted

0719 Ikeda Hayato becomes Prime Minister

1108 Kennedy wins the presidential election

1227 Cabinet meeting adopts the "Double Income Policy"

**1961 (Showa 36)**

0216 Caraway is appointed High Commissioner of Ryukyu Islands

0419 Reischauer becomes ambassador

0620 Ikeda-Kennedy meeting (~0622)

**1962 (Showa 37)**

0131 Dutch army's transport aircrafts heading towards West Irian, denied access to the Haneda airport

1112 Ohira (Masayoshi) - Kim (Jong-pil) (金鐘泌) note

1022 President Kennedy declares the naval blockade of Cuba (Cuban Crisis)

1104 Ikeda visits Europe

**1963 (Showa 38)**

0725 Initialing of the Test Ban Treaty

1121 30<sup>th</sup> General Election

**1964 (Showa 39)**

0323 UN Conference on Trade and Development(UNCTAD) takes place (~0616)

0401 Japan transferred to Article 8 status

0428 Japan becomes a member of OECD

0710 Ikeda is elected for the third term as President of LDP

0802 Gulf of Tonkin incident (U.S. naval forces attacked by a N. Vietnam torpedo)

1010 Tokyo Olympic Games start.

1109 Eisaku Sato becomes president of the LDP and PM

### **1965 (Showa 40)**

- 0113 Sato visits U.S.; joint statement with Johnson
- 0207 U.S. bombs North Vietnam
- 0622 Japan-South Korea Normalization Treaty
- 0819 Sato visits Okinawa

### **1966 (Showa 41)**

- 0516 Cultural Revolution in China
- 1201 Sato is elected president of the LDP for the second time

### **1967 (Showa 42)**

- 0129 31<sup>st</sup> General Election
- 0421 Sato mentions the Three Principles of Arm Export
- 1115 Japan- U.S. summit: the reversion of Okinawa should be decided within a few years; the reversion of Ogasawara was decided.

### **1968 (Showa 43)**

- 0331 President Johnson declines election bid and announces halt of U.S. bombing of the North Vietnam
- 1120 Sato is elected president of the LDP for the third time (Sato 249, Miki 107, Maeo Shigesaburo 95)

### **1969 (Showa 44)**

- 0310 Sato shows his negotiation policy: a “nuclear free, mainland status” Okinawa
- 1119-20 Sato-Nixon Talks
- 1227 32<sup>nd</sup> General Election

### **1970 (Showa 45)**

- 0622 Japan-U.S. negotiation on textiles, in Washington
- 1029 Sato is elected president of the LDP for the fourth time

### **Materials**

- 1. Joint Statement of Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and U.S. President Richard Nixon (November 21, 1969) [excerpt]**

(para.4)

The President and the Prime Minister specifically noted the continuing tension over the Korean peninsula. The Prime Minister deeply appreciated the peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations in the area and stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security.

The President and the Prime Minister shared the hope that Communist China would adopt a more cooperative and constructive attitude in its external relations. The President referred to the treaty obligations of his country to the Republic of China which the United States would uphold. The Prime Minister said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan.

(para.6)

The Prime Minister emphasized his view that the time had come to respond to the strong desire of the people of Japan, of both the mainland and Okinawa, to have the administrative rights over Okinawa returned to Japan on the basis of the friendly relations between the United States and Japan and thereby to restore Okinawa to its normal status.....They therefore agreed that the two governments would immediately enter into consultations regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of Okinawa without detriment to the security of the Far East including Japan. They further agreed to expedite the consultations with a view to accomplishing the reversion during 1972 subject to the conclusion of these specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support.

(para.8)

The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his deep understanding and assured the Prime Minister that, without prejudice to the position of the United States Government with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.

**2. Prime Minister Sato's Speech at National Press Club (January 12, 1965) [excerpt from the original text]**

*In this speech, Prime Minister Sato noted that Japan would “positively and promptly” respond to prior consultation with the U.S. for the use of U.S. bases in Japan in the events of contingencies in Korea or Taiwan.*

(前略) 特に韓国に対する武力攻撃が発生するようなことがあれば、これは、わが国の安全に重大影響を及ぼすものであります。従つて、万一韓国に対し武力攻撃が発生し、これに対処するため米軍が日本国内の施設、区域を戦闘作戦行動の発進基地として使用しなければならぬような事態が生じた場合には、日本政府としては、このような認識に立つて、事前協議に対し前向きに、かつすみやかに態度を決定する方針であります。

(中略)

台湾地域での平和の維持もわが国の安全にとって重要な要素であります。わたくしは、この点で米国の中華民国に対する条約上の義務遂行の決意を十分に評価しているものであります。万一外部からの武力攻撃に対して、現実に義務が発動されなくてはならない事態が不幸にして生ずるとすれば、そのような事態は、わが国を含む極東の平和と安全を脅かすものになると考えられます。従つて、米国による台湾防衛義務の履行というようなこととなれば、われわれとしては、わが国益上、さきに述べたような認識をふまえて対処してゆくべきものと考えますが、幸いにしてそのような事態は予見されないのであります。

(後略)

(END)