

## **International Donors and the Reform of Indonesian National Police**

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### **Abstract**

Various countries have been involved in the process of the separation of Indonesian National Police (INP) from the military, which started alongside the democratization of the Indonesian state. Although this is not an example of post-conflict peace support operation, it is one of the closest examples where outside intervention seems to have had some impact. This paper examines the efforts by the US, IOM, and Japan each trying to influence the process in its own way, and attempts to draw lessons for post-conflict police building cases.

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- 4. Mr. Yamazaki's Philosophies**
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## **Appendix**

## 1. Indonesian National Police and its legacy of history

Indonesian National Police came under the military umbrella in 1967 during Suharto's "New Order (Orde Baru)" Era. The "Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia" (ABRI: Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) was composed of the three services (former TNI: Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Defense Force) of army, the air force, the navy, and the police. Compared to the other three services, police was rated lower in prestige at that time. Main function of the police was to maintain order in various parts of Indonesia. Because of its large territory, thousands of islands and varying ethnicities (more than 400 according to some estimates), Indonesia's history has been wracked by ethnic uprisings and revolts, which has, for the most parts, been brutally put down.

It was only after the beginning of the reform era after 1998 political revolution (Reformasi era), that the police as part of the military started to be seen as an embarrassing existence. In April 1999, The Habibie government expressed its decision to separate the police force from the military by a presidential decree. On July 1 2000, President Wahid separated the national police (INP) and the armed forces (TNI) and put INP under direct command of the President. Finally in 2002 with its Law No. 2 on Indonesian National Police, a firm legal basis for the existence and independence of the INP was consolidated.<sup>1</sup>

The importance of the democratization and stabilization of Indonesia, with its largest Islamic population in the world, was so obvious, and that a civil police observing democratic principles was essential for a functioning democracy, many countries and organizations were willing to lend a hand to the reform of the Indonesian National Police. The rising threat of terrorism, especially after the Bali bombing of October 12, 2002, only raised the importance of the security in Indonesia. Countries like the US and Australia invested heavily in Indonesian anti-terrorism capabilities, as will be described in the following.

## 2. Countries assisting the reform of Indonesian National Police

The following are the main countries assisting the reform of police sector in Indonesia:

### The United States

The United States of America has a very large program of aiding INP and other law

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<sup>1</sup> UNDANG-UNDANG REPUBLIK INDONESIA, NOMOR 2 TAHUN 2002, TENTANG KEPOLISIAN NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA, <http://www.kpu.go.id/dmdocuments/UU%20KEPOLISIAN.pdf> (accessed, 27<sup>th</sup> Feb 2010)

enforcement agencies. ICITAP (International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program) Indonesia is the American agent of Indonesian police reform.<sup>2</sup> Its aid started with the separation of the police from the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) in 2000. ICITAP is an organization under the U.S. Department of Justice, but the Indonesian police program is funded primarily by the Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). It also receives some funding from USAID. Actually the name "International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL)" is rather misleading because it gives the impression that INL money is mainly for combating drug-trafficking. Actually the INL program lays heavy emphasis on "rule of law" capacity of the recipient countries.<sup>3</sup> This is because they believe in the importance of "strengthening the ability of law enforcement and judicial authorities in both source and transit countries to investigate and prosecute major drug trafficking organizations and their leaders, and to seize and block their assets."<sup>4</sup> Their approach had been developed largely through their effort to counter narcotics crimes in South America, but is now being directed towards other parts of the world.

There are two distinct characteristics of the US approach. Because its aim is oriented towards the capacity to prevent and sanction illicit activities, its emphasis of human rights is less pronounced than most European and international programs. The other characteristic is its multi-dimensional approach to the problem of security. Apart from ICITAP, the US has also OPDAT (Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training) Indonesia, which works on the reform of the prosecutors' side of judicial system.<sup>5</sup>

### **ICITAP Indonesia**

The "International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program" (ICITAP) of the US Department of Justice is by far the most comprehensive attempt amongst many donor organizations to give assistance to "develop professional and transparent law enforcement institutions that protect human rights, combat corruption, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and terrorism." Present director of the program, Gerald Heuett began working at ICITAP in October 2005. This coincided with the assumption of the office of chief of national police (Kapolri) by General Sutanto in July 2005 (8 July 2005 - 30 September 2008). Mr. Heuett considers the taking of office by General Sutanto as a significant starting point for serious reforms.<sup>6</sup> Since then, ICITAP has reviewed and expanded its work considerably.

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.justice.gov/criminal/icitap/> (accessed 10 February 2010)

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/> (accessed 1 March 2010)

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/narc/index.htm> (accessed 2 March 2010)

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.justice.gov/criminal/opdat/> (accessed 2 March 2010)

<sup>6</sup> Interview Gerald Heuett, Jakarta 19 February 2010.

As of December 2009, ICITAP Indonesia has all together 52 employees including 35 local staffs (see ICITAP Organization Chart: Appendix A) and has 14 projects running. These are the followings:

#### **A. Maritime Security (MARSEC)**

Securing the sea-lane in the Indonesian waters is a vital interest for the US and the international community in general. It is also important in order to prevent illegal drug and other trafficking. Marine police, port and border is therefore an important component of international assistance.

In addition, preserving the natural environment for the endangered species became an issue tackled by ISITAP recently.

Organizationally, ICITAP is part of the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice. As of 30 September 2009, ICITAP has 39 country programs, and the Indonesian program is the biggest amongst them. (see appendix A) <sup>7</sup>

- **Marine Police Project**

The focus here is to assist Indonesia in patrol and interdiction operations in strategically important Indonesian waterways in the Malacca Straits and the North Sulawesi Sea. ICITAP also funded 19 patrol boats and a Command Information Center with database connectivity to the INP Marine Police Regional.

- **Port and Border Security**

This project is for the border security of tri-border areas (Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines) of North Sulawesi Sea. ICITAP Indonesia worked with ICITAP Philippines to hold a first tri-lateral Inter-Agency Maritime Security Law Enforcement Conference with Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Bringing these parties together was the necessary first step towards the regional solution of maritime security problem.

- **Environmental and Natural Resource Protection Project (ENRP)**

This project involves various Indonesian counterparts in order to deal with organized environmental crimes impacting Indonesian forests and critical habitat areas. ICITAP's program has expanded to involve working with the Ministry of Forestry and the Ministry of Fisheries for the Environmental and Natural Resource Protection Project. The program involves partners in department of Communications and Sea Transportation, Immigration, Customs, with collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Again, ICITAP was the first to attempt to bring all these parties to one table. ICITAP works on the assumption that conversion of understanding of the nature of problem was necessary in order to start finding the solution.

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<sup>7</sup> Blueprint for strengthening Polres & Polsek (ICITAP)

## **B. Criminal Investigation Development**

The emphasis in this field is on necessary technical training and equipment aid. Following are the list of individual project for training and equipment aid.

- Forensic Development Project
- Criminal Investigations Division Development Project
- Cyber Crime Project
- Trafficking-in-person (TIP) Project
- Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
- Optical Disc Regulation (ODR) Project

## **C. Management Systems**

There are two main focuses in Management field: Emergency management and corruption.

- Standard Emergency Management Systems (SEMS)  
This system is concerned with the ability of the INP in dealing with natural disasters and national emergency situations. SEMS was recently used in the Padang September 2009 earthquake. The INP is requiring all INP commands to follow SEMS, and this is expected to be a law in 2010.
- Professional Standard/ Anti-Corruption Project  
Since January 2005, this project has concentrated on watching the implementation of policies and procedures under ICITAP program.
- Millennium Challenge Corporation  
This project is under collaboration with USAID to improve the capability of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) by providing equipment and training.

## **D. National Training Reform**

- Use of Force Policy and Socialization  
Working with the INP, ICITAP developed a “Use of Force Policy and Resistance Control Form Law” in January 2009. This law exceeds the standards about use of force by police, established by the United Nations, and is said to be the first in all of greater Asia. Training and socialization according to this law began in May 2009 and is ongoing.
- National Training and Curriculum Reform  
Representatives from ICITAP, INP Training institutions, local universities and the Ministry of Education come together in this project to examine training and curriculum for the education of INP.

Gerald Heuett sees Management training and Use of Force Law as the more important

reforms he has introduced, because of their self-sustainability. He considers that these reforms have been integrated into the organizational structure that even after ICITAP has withdrawn, they would be able to carry on, on their own. On the other hand, projects on environment or forensic development still have a long way to go before they can be seen as locally sustainable.

**OPDAT** (Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training)

OPDAT Indonesia is new compared to ICITAP Indonesia. The organization of OPDAT itself was created in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice in 1991 in response to the growing threat of international crimes. It is funded and authorized by interagency agreements between OPDAT on one side and three US government partners on the other: Department of State; USAID; and Millennium Challenge Corporation.<sup>8</sup> Its first Resident Legal Advisor (RLA) Robert Strang arrived in 2005. Terry Kinney, a federal prosecutor from Chicago, arrived in August 2006. The two RLAs run the Indonesia Justice Sector Development program.

The programs run by these two RLAs include: building of Terrorism and Transnational Crime Task Force (Satgas) in the AGO which contributed to the prosecution of 42 terrorists, including 26 Jamaah Islamiyah members; drafting of the new criminal procedure reform; helped the establishment of anti-corruption task force by the Office of the Attorney-General; help to improve the training at AGO Training Center; drafting of asset forfeiture laws; help by the procedure of mutual legal assistance (MLA); help in prosecuting environmental crimes; and bringing a team of reform task force of AGO to the US and Chile.<sup>9</sup>

The reforms by ICIDAT and OPDAT Indonesia are more comprehensive than any other countries plans. It is also most well funded. But given this, it is far from sufficient. For one thing, they have started helping with police and AGO reforms but not that of the court. There are some court reform assisted by USAID, but there is no close working relationship that exists between ICIDAT and OPDAT, which are both under the MoJ umbrella. The training of ICIDAT and OPDAT often take place together since the police and the AGO must understand their mutual functions and sharing of the responsibilities as well as duties.

Also, this is a dilemma faced by any aid organization, that they can ‘bring the horse to the water but cannot force it to drink.’ You can go only as far as the recipient country

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<sup>8</sup> OPDAT factsheet, October 15, 2009. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is a US aid agency created by the US government to combat global poverty. (<http://www.mcc.gov/> accessed 10 March 2010)

<sup>9</sup> OPDAT Indonesia Fact Sheet, November 20, 2009.

wants. ICITAT and OPDAT Indonesia have done excellent work helping the Indonesian counterpart to draw up necessary legislative drafts. But in order this to be effective, these drafts need to be approved by the President and the Parliament. Due to political situations, this has not been easy to get recently. But nobody is in a place to force these reform bills on the people of Indonesia.

### **IOM (International Organization for Migration)**

IOM office in Jakarta has a project named “Strengthening the Indonesian National Police through Institution Building,” which is funded by the Netherlands Embassy.<sup>10</sup>

Their work has been headed by Maria Sarah Domingo from the very first day in 2004. As may be imagined, General Sutanto as Chief of Police was a strong supporter also for IOM community policing project.

Police reform is not a topic that IOM usually gets involved with. But IOM Indonesia has dealt with the problems in the field of illegal migration, community policing, and human rights. They have found the local network they have built in order to help migrants has also been useful in the community policing project.

The rule of law in Indonesia still stands on a very fragile basis. Whereas in developed countries, a rule would not be binding until it passes the legislative to become a “law,” in Indonesia, a decree of the Chief of Indonesian Police may have a significant meaning, and a document signed by the Minister of law and human rights can be named a “law.”

General Sutanto, the chief of Indonesian police (Kapolri) since July 2005 (8 July 2005 - 30 September 2008), issued several important decrees with the help of IMO, such as the decree on the Implementation of the Community Policing Model (Kebijakan dan Strategi Penerapan Model Perpolisian Masyarakat Dalam Penyelenggaraan Tugas POLRI, Skep/737/X/2005) and its subsequent amendments.

Most salient achievements of the IOM program have been human rights and community policing. They have compiled textbooks for both subjects (which have been revised repeatedly) together with INP counterparts, which are now used by all new recruits in the educational system of INP. Skep 737 of the year 2007 is regarded like a “code of conduct.” Training manuals modules have been developed and distributed throughout the INP, and around one third of the higher ranking officers have been trained on these subjects.

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<sup>10</sup> “Evaluation Report for IOM Project Part I, Phase II, Strengthening the Indonesian National Police through Institution Building, funded by the Royal Netherlands Embassy. May-August 2007,” Evaluation of the Phase II part II (“Evaluation, Strengthening the Indonesian National Police through Institution Building,” is available from IOM.

Pilot projects have been chosen for community policing and human rights and have proven generally satisfactory.

The IOM project has altogether 11 staff and 5 consultants. Many of them are Indonesians which is considered crucial for the success of the program.

But the December 2009 evaluation report points out that the program has reached a point where INP needs to show its own leadership and introduce the system into the whole of Indonesia. If this does not come about, the project will be seen to be “stalled and sponsor support may be placed in jeopardy.” It also pointed out that while it is easy to count the numbers of the training given, it is harder to measure the real effectiveness of the training itself. This difficulty is common to most of the training projects. Although it is clear that longer term sustainability is important, this is often hampered by the lack of funding. Their willingness to do so is very often beyond the control of IOM. The report tells that it is ‘often difficult to gauge the extent to which INP behaviour had actually been altered by the program and whether it was going to be sustainable in the longer run.’

#### **DCAF**

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) has a program since 2007 on security sector reform. The program is arranged in partnership with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES: German Social Democratic think tank). It has national offices in Jakarta, Indonesian NGOs and members of the Indonesian parliament. It is centered on the socialization of parliamentarians and NGOs on the significance of the Parliament in controlling the security sector.<sup>11</sup>

#### **Other donors (Australia, EU, Asia Foundation)**

The Australian government is naturally interested in law and order of Indonesian society since its proximity means what happens in Indonesia has direct effect upon its nationals. Australia has two institutions in Indonesia: One is JCLEC (Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation) which is actually in Semarang, and the other is TNCC (Transnational Crime Coordination Center) in Jakarta. Both projects concentrate on terrorism. JCLEC Provides training for Indonesian officials through short term (1-2weeks) courses and seminars. TNCC is trying to work out a database of transnational crime, but the Indonesian infrastructure is still too weak to be able to maintain an effectively working database, so their effort at the moment is more towards making a better IT infrastructure.

Both EU and Asia Foundation put some money into community policing, but has remained marginal actors.

### **3. The Japanese government and Indonesian National Police**

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<sup>11</sup> [http://www.dcaf.ch/security-sector-reform-indonesia/\\_index.cfm](http://www.dcaf.ch/security-sector-reform-indonesia/_index.cfm)

### **The Koban system and Singapore**

One of the early experiences of international cooperation of the Japanese Police seems to have been with Singapore. This still needs to be confirmed but it appears that the “Koban” system was introduced to Singapore in the 1980s.

The Koban system is explained by Japanese government as following:

“The Japanese Koban system is designated to maintain safety and peace in local community through daily contact with community residents.

Accordingly, Koban officers conduct such wide activities as preventing crimes, arresting suspects, controlling traffic, taking care of lost children and drunks, handling lost and found articles, counseling citizens in troubles, while maintaining around-the-clock vigilance, patrolling neighborhood and visiting houses and companies in the community. In order to enhance the safety and security of the community, widely available police service and police-community interaction are two important pillars.”<sup>12</sup>

In Singapore, this was considered quite a success, and Japan and Singapore collaborated in the 90’s to export this system further, funded by JICA.

### **UNTAC Experience (1992-3)**

The participation of the Japanese police and the JSDF (Japan Self Defense Force) in the UNTAC (UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia; February 1992-September 1993) operation was a historical turning point in Japanese history. It was the first time the Japanese sent armed forces abroad since the end of the Second World War. The JSDF sent approximately 600 soldiers, whereas the Police sent altogether 75 officers. The Japanese government backed up the Cambodian peace process strongly and despite the death of two Japanese nationals (one UN Volunteer Atsushi Nakata and one police officer, Assistant Police Inspector Haruyuki Takada), did not reverse its commitment.

Although UNTAC is considered to be one of the more successful UN Peacekeeping operations,<sup>13</sup> for the Japanese police, the death of one of its colleagues left a very negative memory. Throughout the rest of 1990’s Japan was very self restrictive when it came to sending the civilian police abroad.

Whereas the SDF could work in a relatively large military unit, the police were integrated into international police as individuals and not as a police unit. This made communication and security control very difficult. There was also a sense of mission

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<sup>12</sup> “SEMINAR ON COMMUNITY POLICING STRATEGIES EVOLVING FROM THE KOBAN SYSTEM OF JAPAN AND THE NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICE CENTRE SYSTEM OF SINGAPORE,” 17 August to 21 August 2009, General Information Brochure.

<sup>13</sup> Michael W. Doyle & Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War & Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006, pp. 200-223.

creep as the Japanese police had expected advisory role for the Cambodian police, whereas in reality, Cambodian police was far from sufficient and the UN police had to stand in and do the actual policing in the absence of UN.

### **Relationship with the Indonesian National Police (2000- )**

When the Indonesian democratization process started in 1998, the former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto became aware of the need for security sector reform and sent Mr. Hiroto Yamazaki, who had served as a police attaché in Jakarta Embassy between 1988-1991, and had served as the chief of Japanese police sent to UNTAC. In year 2000, Mr. Yamazaki was sent to Indonesia in order to explore the possibility of cooperation with the Japanese police. As a result of the mission, the then chief of Police Agency Setsuo Tanaka decided to send Mr. Yamazaki as an advisor to the Chief of INP, Rusdiharjo. Mr. Yamazaki remained at the job until 2005, giving advice to 4 chiefs of police, Rusdiharjo (4 January 2000-22 September 2000), General Suroyo Bimantoro (23 September 2000-28 November 2001), Da'i Bachtiar (29 November 2001-7 July 2005), and General Sutanto (8 July 2005-30 September 2008). Behind this decision was a long standing friendship between Mr. Yamazaki and Rusdiharjo, which dates back to 1988. The two dramatically reencountered each other in Cambodia in 1993. They were both chief of the civilian police mission sent from their own country.

After Mr. Yamazaki, two police officers, Takeuchi and Uematsu, served as advisor to the INP chief, and since summer 2009, Mr. Yamazaki is serving again in Jakarta. During these 10 years, Japan developed a unique program of assistance for the INP. At the focus of cooperation between the two countries was again the “Koban” system of Japan. The INP was trying to develop its own concept of civilian police, and the introduction of Koban system was to contribute to change the relationship between the police and the citizens.

Mr. Yamazaki recalls that there were many requests from Indonesian side for tangible goods like police cars, communication system, etc, or money to buy these things, but that he tried very hard to resist these requests for goods and money. Instead, he set as his aim to try to change the mentality, ways and frameworks of thinking, and the actual behavior of the Indonesian police. This can probably be termed “socialization” in today’s IR vocabulary.

This “socialization” was put into shape as mainly two projects. One which started earlier was to invite a group of Indonesian policemen to Japan every year, and have them look at the Japanese police in action. The other was to invite Japanese policemen to Indonesia as JICA specialists and ask them to work as advisors to several Kobans and to give the Indonesian police, kind of on the job training.

### **JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) Special Group Training Course "Comparative study on Police system" for Republic Indonesia (Feb 2003-ongoing)**

The program which was to form one of the pillars of the Japanese assistance to INP was the training program for young policemen. This was decided in the working group in 2002, and the first 10 policemen were selected in December 2002 and sent to Japan for two months, starting from February 2003. The components of the training program has remained virtually unchanged since the first time. These were:

#### **(1) Candidate selection**

Candidates were to be police officers younger than 40 years old (captain or major) who would become future leadership of the INP. For older members of the INP, separate visiting programs were arranged. The candidates were interviewed by joint Japanese-Indonesian committee, in order to avoid any nepotism. English knowledge was not required, each group was accompanied by an interpreter.

10 officers were sent the first year, this was increased to 24 the next year (2004), and has remained that number since then.

#### **(2) Preparatory briefing:**

To make the most of the time spent in Japan, the selected candidates were assembled in Jakarta and were given a preparatory briefing. Here they were given general information about Japanese society, culture, politics, economics as well as about the Japanese police system.

#### **(3) Training in Japan (approximately 8 weeks)**

The officers were divided into groups of 3, each group was allocated to a police station with an interpreter. Only the first and the last week are spent in Tokyo, all the other time they spend in local police stations and they will have a first hand experience of how Japanese police is functioning, alongside the Koban system.

#### **(4) Program after coming back to Indonesia**

When the trainees return, they are required immediately to report to the Chief of the INP about their training in Japan. They also need to write a report and do a presentation before the working group. The trainees have access to reports of the previous years, which most of them read beforehand in order to prepare for the visit.

#### **(5) Alumni**

The selected candidates meet the alumni of the program before they start off to Japan. The alumni has been formed by the Indonesian officers themselves, called "Ikatan

Sakura INDONESIA.” Already, nine teams have been sent to Japan, encompassing 190 policemen.

The officers who have finished the program are now working in various parts of Indonesia, and the earliest ones are now entering the leadership cadre of the INP. As the program continues, those officers having experienced Japanese style of police will form a considerable “epistemic community” bound by a shared standard values about the role of the police in the society.

### **JICA Technical Cooperation Project: Phase 1 (2001- ) “Promotion of community policing project”**

The overall goal of the assistance program was to “win a basic trust from the people.” In order to realize this, two objectives were set: “Answer faithfully to the reporting of the citizens (i.e., better criminal investigation ability),” and “to respond rapidly to the reporting of the citizens (better command and communication system).”

The working group decided to choose a site as a “pilot site,” which would, if successful, serve as a model for others to follow. After long deliberation, Bekasi police, about 40 minutes north east of Jakarta, was chosen as the model. Bekasi was a mix of urban area, agricultural area, manufacturing area, business area and fishery area.

Director-General of the National Police Agency Tanaka of Japan visited Jakarta in July 2002 and signed the project contract in person. The project started officially from 1 August 2002. The first phase lasted till March 2006. This consisted of several components.

#### **(1) Introduction of Koban concept into Indonesian police (community policing):**

The “Koban” concept was translated into BKPM (Balai Kemitraan Polisi dan Masyarakat: Center of partnership between police and citizens). 14 BKPM all together were established during Phase I. Building without soft ware has no meaning, so police advisors sent from Japan introduced step by step systems used in Japanese community policing. They also had help from the members of the Sakura-kai who had the first-hand experience of the Japanese system. Without these officers acting as a kind of interpreter of organization culture, the program would have been totally impossible.

The systems introduced were:

24 hours shift of BKPMs, clear area of responsibility for each BKPM, the practice of visiting house by house the citizens of the responsible area and keeping the record of the particularities of each household (“Junkai renraku”), and the system of communication between the BKPMs and between BKPM and headquarter.

The precondition for such a system to function is of course the existence of high level of trust between the police and the citizens. This could only be achieved through time and effort. The Indonesian police came up with the idea of an FKPM for each BKPM. In the FKPM (Forum Kemitraan Polisi dan Masyarakat: Forum for cooperation between the police and the citizens), local police, local government, religious institutions, and local community are each represented and come together in order to communicate and better understand the problems and needs of the local community. In order that local community also gain understanding of the underlying culture of community policing system, representatives of the FKPM are sent to Japan to experience the functioning of the community police.

In the course of four years, the INP side also came up with original ideas. One was BKPMs solely consisting of women. There are at present two BKPMs consisting only of women. Japanese police were skeptical whether such a system is plausible and desirable because of the security concerns. But for rural areas, BKPM consisting only of women was deemed not only feasible, but also very efficient, clean and accessible. Women could also approach female policemen more easily considering the cultural background.

By the initiative of Da'i Bachtiar, three prefectures were chosen in Java which would copy the Bekasi system (September 2002). This would in turn serve as a model for further dissemination of the system.

This program is now in its tenth year and JICA has asked AC Nielsen to conduct opinion polls about the police in Bukasi, where Koban concept has been introduced and another place where it has not (Appendix B). The result seems to show that Japanese effort actually has had some effect on the better practice of community policing.

## (2) The improvement of scientific criminal investigation ability

A specialist of the criminal investigation was sent to teach their Indonesian counterpart. They conducted training in the laboratory, organized criminal investigation competitions in Indonesia, "certification" of the ability of criminal investigation.

The ability of each investigator to conduct each parts of the investigation improved. But lacking a larger scale understanding and system of scientific investigation, it was still very difficult to make actual use of the ability they gained through training.

For example, the policemen at actual criminal site had no idea about preservation of evidence; even if they were able to find evidence and finger prints at the place, there existed no nation-wide or even local data-base of finger prints, so they could make no use of it.

Here again, the problem of the trust the policemen earn in the community was a hurdle.

People often preferred not to inform the police, fearing they would only be required to pay some bribe without getting any help at all.

In order that the community policing, as well as criminal investigation to function, people need to trust the police so that they would inform the police immediately after the crime. In Japan, police station can be reached by dialing 110 anywhere in Japan. INP emulated this system by choosing 112 as their emergency call. But the knowledge of the existence of this dial number is very limited, and Japanese specialists are trying to find a way to better publicize the existence of this number.

### (3) Improving both hardware and software of Command and communication system

The main communication tool for the INP is still the mobile phones. In the absence of any alternative, this is inevitable. Japan provided 503 portable radio communication devices as well as 86 devices to be installed in police cars. A command and communication center has been established in order to make these devices function as a system.

To the point, it has been quite difficult to make the Indonesian police officers understand how the system should actually function. They cannot understand the notion that it is important that all the policemen in the network share the same information and know who has received what kind of command.

The fact that INP still retains military characteristics shows in the assumption that orders need only to be shared vertically by the line directly involved in the action, and not horizontally.

Now having a command and communication for Bekasi Police district only was definitely insufficient if it could not be integrated into a bigger system used or planned by INP. So short term specialists was invited from Japan and they spent two and a half month in summer 2003, examining the Bekasi police, Jakarta Police, the Indonesian National Police and the related institutions and companies. The work is still going on to put into place a functioning system of radio communication.

### (4) Education of the future officers: Instructor to PTIK.

Many officers who take up higher responsibility will at a certain stage spend some time studying at Police Science College (PTIK: PERGURUAN TINGGI ILUM KEPOLISIAN). In order to bring about better understanding of community policing and the merits of Japanese systems of Koban, A lecturer was sent from Japan to PTIK to teach about Japanese police. The first lecturer, Mr. Suzuki is about to finish his two years service period.

### (5) Cooperation in Drug Inspection method

Again from the initiative of Chief of Indonesian Police Da'i Bachtiar, Japanese side started sending drug investigation specialists. At first this was thought not to be a good field of cooperation since INP had European approach of considering the suspects as a victim of the system and to give him medical treatment. Japanese system was different in that they handled the suspects simply as criminals. So the Japanese side found area of possible cooperation in the field of investigation. In order to identify the drugs faster, they brought in scientific kits from Japan and started educating Indonesian policemen. The first specialist Ryohei Idemia, also compiled a vast "Drug Manual" for Indonesian police in both book form and CD-RM. This comprises almost all kinds of drugs handled in Indonesia.

#### (6) Bali tourist police project

The Bali bombing incident of 12 October 2002 had a devastating effect on the image of Bali and of Indonesia. In order to repair the tainted image of Bali, the chief of Police of Bali, Made Mangku Pastika. Advisors were invited from the United States, Australia and Japan. In the end, the Japanese advisors lasted longer, and the effort is ongoing to reform the Bali police into a civilian type of police.

#### (7) Controlling the effects of cooperation

It is not easy to control the effects so complex like police. The Japanese group has entrusted an opinion poll company to do a constructive review of the scheme and see how satisfied the citizen of Bekasi are about their police. (Chart to be provided)

The result was a slight increase in persons who noted positive result.

### **4. Mr. Yamazaki's Philosophies**

The Japanese projects have been very strongly influenced by Mr. Yamazaki's personal beliefs and philosophies about how best to aid developing countries' police. Upon consultation with him, I will list some of them here:

- Give as little money or goods as possible.
- Try to influence the mental framework and thinking of the INP policemen.
- Never force anything on the INP. Let them choose what they like. Wait for their initiative.
- Quality control of the personnel is very important: personal selection of his team and successors + Indonesian candidates
- Keep the team small.
- Respect the people. Learn their culture. Speak their language.
- Value Indonesian initiatives.
- Adjust and improvise as you go along
- Don't hurry. Don't give up. Keep trying.

Mr. Yamazaki does not hide the fact that he has been in love with Indonesia ever since he went there for the first time as a young attaché for the Japanese Embassy in Jakarta. When asked, what the most important thing is, he replies, “Find someone who loves the country as much as I love Indonesia.”

### **5. Some Implications for the Post-Conflict Peace Support Operations**

This paper has explored the example of reform of Indonesian National Police. Several observations can be made out of this process:

- There are projects which try to enhance the ability and effectiveness of certain capabilities. For example, forensic capabilities or anti-terrorism investigation capabilities. This can be further divided into teaching individual skills at individual levels, and constructing a system or a network which enables INP to utilize those skills. The former is much easier than the latter.
  
- Understanding how a system or a network functions is much harder to comprehend than what one should or should not do at individual levels. Why having a radio system for the whole team is better than each having a cell phone and all of them trying to call one another. How accumulation of data can be utilized in future commitment of crimes, and so forth. This very often requires a change of mental framework. For this, the experience of actually seeing a working system/network might be much more useful than just hearing about them in the lecture room. But such training takes a generation to really sink in to the structure of the organization. The first batch of young officers who had chances to come into contacts with police organization of developed countries are now coming into the leadership of INP and many donor countries expect much more from this generation than the older one.
- The same can be said about community policing. Many INP officials described this as “changing from the police which protects the state from the people to police which protects the people.” It is one thing to memorize this phrase, it is another thing to comprehend what it means. This also requires a fundamental change of mental framework. Just building BKPMs or Babimkamtimbus does not add up to community policing. This is one reason the visiting programs for the young officers have much more potential than classroom tutoring. But here again, we have not seen the measurable results yet. It takes at least one generation for the reforms to take roots.
  
- There are also projects which try to prevent certain kinds of conducts from occurring. Typical examples would be human rights abuses and corruption.
- It is easy to count the number of trainings conducted. It is not easy to measure if these trainings have achieved the desired result. The INP now has a very good


textbook about human rights and community policing. All new recruits are supposed to receive trainings about these concepts in one form or another. But it is not clear if these processes have led to less abuse of human rights or a better quality community policing. We also need to address the difficulty of constructing systems and networks as opposed to individual skills.

- The same can be said about education against corruption. You can conduct thousands of sessions against corruption, but this may not have any effect at all. More indirect way of making the police pay rolls better and raising their material well-being may have much direct impact on the corruption. INP is also aware of this and is trying to increase police salaries, so that INP is now better paid than the military.
  
- As mentioned above, there are measures which try to (a) enhance the capabilities of the police; and (b) which try to prevent the abuse of power or influences. The former can be practiced on any kind of police, even at a very early stage. Therefore, it will probably be useful to conduct this kind of training in post-conflict societies. As for the latter, we must look back upon our own constitutional history. The monopoly of the violence by the state took several centuries in the Western societies. During this transition period, there were often abominable atrocities and excesses conducted also in these societies. It was only after this stage that these societies turned to limiting the power of the state and finding ways to prevent the abuse of power by state organs.  
 For a society like Indonesia, which experienced decades of violent and authoritarian period during which power was concentrated to the state, efforts to reduce the abuse of power has meanings, although you can argue about best ways to achieve these ends. But in post-conflict societies, where monopoly of violence by the state is far from established, effort to limit abuse of power may have little meaning since these officials may themselves be forced to use violence in order to protect themselves from the violence still possessed by opposition forces within the state. It may be more cost effective to concentrate more on capability enhancement trainings and limit the abuse-restrictive education to a relatively small proportion in post-conflict societies
  
- One last implication maybe, that assistance to reform remains bilateral exercise, strongly influenced by individuals involved. In Indonesian case, General Sutanto as INP leader was very important in kicking off many of the projects. Personalities like Gerald Heuett or Haruhito Yamazaki have also heavily influenced the reform process. Seeing the difference in underlying philosophies of these people about what outside assistance should address, it is hard to conceive these efforts being done multilaterally. There may be better communication between different donor countries. But simply dumping the wallets together will totally destroy the spirit of

the reform. Such practice is often observed in post-conflict cases where the international society (more often Japan) lays the money in a common fund and entrusts some international organization to implement them. This will most probably lead to the least common denominator and will not get the most out of the money spent.


### Appendix

<Appendix A>



&lt;Appendix B&gt;

## Opinion Poll by AC Nielsen to the inhabitants of Bekasi Police Area



### Interviewee:

1,604 人 (Bekasi)

408 人 (Sidarjo)

### Out of the population of:

3.165 million (Bekasi)

1.625 million (Sidarjo)